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Abstract—In 2001, two information theoretic anonymity met-
rics were proposed: the effective anonymity set size and the
degree of anonymity. Here, we propose an abstract model for a
general anonymity system which is consistent with the definition
of anonymity on which the metrics are based. We revisit entropy-
based anonymity metrics, and we apply them to Crowds, a
practical anonymity system. We discuss the differences between
the two metrics and the results obtained in the example.
Index Terms—Anonymity, metrics, entropy
I. INTRODUCTION
The need of a metric to measure the performance of
anonymity implementations appeared with the development of
applications that enabled anonymous electronic transactions,
such as untraceable email, electronic voting, anonymous e-
coins or privacy-enhanced web browsing.
The research questions that arose were: how can anonymity
be measured? How can two different anonymity systems be
compared? Is there a general anonymity metric which can be
applied to any anonymity system? How can we evaluate the
effectiveness of different attacks on the anonymity system?
How can we quantify losses and gains in anonymity? How can
anonymity metrics reflect the partial or statistic information
often obtained by an adversary? The metrics described here
provide answers to these questions.
The anonymity metrics presented in this paper were orig-
inally proposed in [3], [9], and can be applied to concrete
systems, adversaries, and conditions. These metrics give a
measure of the size and distinguishability of the set of subjects
potentially linked to a particular transaction, and attacked
by a concrete adversary. In order to get an idea on the
performance of an anonymity implementation under different
conditions, multiple anonymity measurements must be made
and analyzed.
Information theoretic metrics can be applied to a broad
range of anonymity systems. It is thus important to understand
the concepts behind entropy-based anonymity metrics in order
to apply and interpret them correctly in concrete scenarios. The
metrics must be adapted to the anonymity system under study,
and the computation of probability distributions that lead to
meaningful metric values is not always obvious.
We put this work into context by describing the related work
in Sec. II. The model for anonymity systems is described
in Sect III, and the attack model in Sect. IV. Section V
describes information theoretic anonymity metrics, which are
then applied to a practical example in Sect VI. Finally,
Sect. VII presents the conclusions of this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Defining anonymity
Prior to the quantification of anonymity, a working def-
inition for the term anonymity was needed. Pfitzmann and
Hansen [7] defined anonymity as the state of being not
identifiable within a set of subjects, the anonymity set. This
definition, first proposed in year 2000, has been adopted in
most of the anonymity literature.
According to the Pfitzmann-Hansen definition of anonymity,
the subjects who may be related to an anonymous transaction
constitute the anonymity set for that particular transaction. A
subject carries on the transaction anonymously if he cannot
be distinguished (by an adversary) from other subjects. This
definition of anonymity captures the probabilistic information
obtained by adversaries trying to identify anonymous subjects,
as we explain in Sect. V.
B. Anonymity metrics
Before information theoretic anonymity metrics were pro-
posed, there had been some attempts to quantify anonymity in
communication networks.
Reiter and Rubin [8] define the degree of anonymity as a
probability 1 − p, where p is the probability assigned by an
attacker to potential senders. In this model, users are more
anonymous as they appear (towards a certain adversary) to be
less likely of having sent a message. This metric considers
users separately, and therefore does not capture anonymity
properties very well. Consider a first system with 2 users
which appear to be the sender of a message with probability
1/2. Now consider a second system with 1000 users. User u1
appears as the sender with probability 1/2, while all the other
users are assigned probabilities of having sent the message
below 0.001. According to the definition of Reiter and Rubin,
the degree of anonymity of u1 and of the two users of the first
system would be the same (50%). However, in the second
system, u1 looks much more likely to be the sender than
any other user; while the two users of the first system are
indistinguishable to the adversary.
Berthold et al. [1] define the degree of anonymity as A =
log2(N), where N is the number of users of the system. This
metric only depends on the number of users of the system,
and therefore does not express the anonymity properties of
different systems. Moreover, adversaries may be able to obtain
probabilistic information on the set of potential senders, which
is not taken into account in this metric.
Information theoretic anonymity metrics were indepen-
dently proposed in two papers presented at the 2nd Workshop
on Privacy Enhancing Technologies. The basic principle of
both metrics is the same. The metric proposed by Serjantov
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Fig. 1. Model for Anonymity Systems
and Danezis [9] uses entropy as measure of the effective
anonymity set size. The one presented by Dı´az et al. [3] goes
one step further, normalizing the entropy to obtain a degree of
anonymity in the scale 0..1. The details of the two flavors of
anonymity metrics are explained in Sect. V.
Examples on how to apply information theoretic anonymity
metrics to practical anonymous communication systems based
on mixes have been presented by Dı´az et al. in [4], [5], [6].
III. MODEL
Many anonymity systems can be modeled in terms of
unlinkability. Unlinkability is defined by Pfitzmann and
Hansen [7] as follows:unlinkability of two or more items
means that within this system, these items are no more and
no less related than they are related concerning the a priori
knowledge.
Our model can be applied both to sender and recipient
anonymity. If we consider the sending and receiving of mes-
sages as Items Of Interest (IOIs), anonymity may be defined as
unlinkability of an IOI and a subject. More specifically, we can
describe the anonymity of an IOI such that it is not linkable
to any subject, and the anonymity of a subject as not being
linkable to any IOI. In this context, unlinkability is achieved
with high entropy values.
Figure 1 presents a simplified anonymity model. The goal of
anonymity systems is to hide the relationship between subjects
and IOIs. Hiding these links is the basic mechanism behind
anonymous transactions.
An observer of the system sees that a set of users are
accessing the anonymity system. At the output of the system,
they see IOIs which are hard to link to a particular subject.
The set of subjects who might be linked to an IOI is called
the anonymity set. The larger the anonymity set, the more
anonymity a subject is enjoying. The notion of anonymity set
is key to define anonymity metrics, as we show in Sect. V-B.
IV. ATTACK MODEL
We can distinguish two types of attacks on anonymity
systems: attacks on anonymity and attacks on the availability
of the anonymity service (also called denial of service attacks).
Denial of service attacks may only be deployed by active
attackers (see description below). These attacks are aimed at
reducing the availability of the system, which may be a goal
in itself, or part of an attack on anonymity (e.g., the adversary
may block several entities from accessing the system in order
to reduce the anonymity set). In this paper, we are interested
in the effects of the attacks on anonymity. More specifically,
in measuring the certainty of the adversary on the existence
of a link between a subject and an IOI.
The quantification of anonymity is dependent on the ad-
versary or attacker considered. The adversary has certain
capabilities and deploys attacks in order to gain information
and find links between subjects and IOIs. Most of these attacks
lead to a distribution of probabilities that assign users a certain
probability of being linked (either as senders or as recipients)
to IOIs.
The metric we propose here takes into account the probabil-
ities assigned by the adversary to users potentially linked to an
IOI. Note that the metric measures anonymity with respect to a
particular attack; results are no longer valid if the attack model
changes. Therefore, concrete assumptions about the attacker
have to be clearly specified when measuring anonymity. Some
of the adversary’s properties we should make explicit are [1]:
• Passive-Active: A passive attacker listens to the com-
munication and/or reads internal information of entities
participating in the protocols, passive attackers typically
perform traffic analysis of the communication. Active
attackers can add, remove or modify messages and adapt
internal information of participating entities.
• Internal-External: An internal attacker controls one or
several entities that are part of the system (e.g., the at-
tacker controls communication nodes). External attackers
only control communication links.
• Partial-Global: A global attacker has access to the entire
communication system (e.g., all communication links),
while a partial attacker (also called local attacker in the
literature) only sees part of the resources (e.g., a limited
number of peers in a peer-to-peer network).
• Static-Adaptive: Static attackers control a predefined set
of resources and are unable to alter their behavior once a
transaction is in progress. Adaptive attackers gain control
on new resources or modify their behavior, depending on
intermediate results of the attack.
• Temporary-Permanent: Permanent adversary have been
observing the system since it started functioning and
knows its whole history. Temporary attackers start ob-
serving or attacking the system at time t0, and they do
not have information on events previous to t0.
V. INFORMATION THEORETIC ANONYMITY METRICS
In this section, we first introduce the concept of entropy,
on which information theoretic anonymity metrics are based.
Then, we explain how the effective anonymity set size and the
degree of anonymity can be computed. The metrics presented
in this section are applied to a practical system in Sect. VI.
A. Entropy
The information theoretic concept of entropy [10] provides
a measure of the uncertainty of a random variable. Let X be
the discrete random variable with probability mass function
pi = Pr(X = i), where i represents each possible value that
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Fig. 2. Anonymity set
X may take with probability pi > 0. In this case, each i
corresponds to a subject of the anonymity set; i.e., pi is the
probability of subject i being linked to the IOI.
We denote by H(X) the entropy of a random variable, and






B. Effective anonymity set size
The effective anonymity set size is an intermediate step
to compute the degree of anonymity. Serjantov and Danezis
proposed in [9] the use of the effective anonymity set size as
metric.
As mentioned in Sect. II-A, anonymity was defined by
Pfitzmann and Hansen [7] as the state of being not identifiable
within a set of subjects, the anonymity set. Anonymity metrics
aim at giving a meaningful measure of the anonymity set size.
After deploying an attack on an anonymity system, the ad-
versary typically obtains a distribution of probabilities that link
subjects to the particular IOI of the attack. The probabilities
are shown in Fig. 2 with the arrows that connect the IOI to the
subjects of the anonymity set. Different subjects may appear
as having a higher or lower probability pi of link with the IOI,
depending of the information obtained by the adversary using
the attack.
Let N be the total number of subjects which are linked to
the IOI with a non-zero probability (pi > 0, i = 1..N ). The
effective anonymity set size is defined as the entropy H(X)
of the distribution X of probabilities that link the subjects of
the anonymity set to the IOI.
Entropy-based anonymity metrics give a measure of the
uncertainty of the adversary on the subject who is related to
the IOI. The effective anonymity set size takes into account
the number of potential subjects linked to the IOI, and the
probabilities assigned to the subjects.
The metric (and thus anonymity) increases its value with
two factors. First, with the number of subjects potentially
linked to the IOI; and second, with the uniformity of the
probability distribution. The more equally distributed the prob-
abilities assigned to the subjects of the anonymity set, the
higher the entropy (i.e., the higher the effective anonymity set
size).
C. Degree of anonymity
The degree of anonymity is a normalized version of the
effective anonymity set size, which tells tells how good the
system is performing on a 0−1 scale. This metric is an original
contribution of Dı´az et al. and was proposed in [3] (note that
both metrics were proposed independently at the same time).
The maximum effective anonymity set size for N subjects
is reached when all subjects are linked to the IOI with
equal probability (i.e., pi = 1/N ). In this case, all subjects
are indistinguishable towards the adversary with respect to
the IOI. For a given number N of users, the maximum
achievable anonymity corresponds to the entropy of a uniform
distribution. We denote the maximum entropy by HM :
HM = log2(N) .
If we assume that the adversary has no a priori information
on the system (i.e., the a priori anonymity of an IOI is HM ),
the amount of information gained by the adversary with an
attack is the difference in the entropy before and after the
attack, that is: HM −H(X).
The degree of anonymity is defined as the normalized value
of this difference in knowledge of the adversary:






As we can observe in the formula, the degree of anonymity
is obtained dividing the effective anonymity set size by the
maximum entropy for a given number of subjects. This degree
evaluates how much anonymity is provided by a system inde-
pendently from the number of users. Given a certain number
of subjects, the computation of the degree of anonymity gives
an idea on how close the anonymity of the subjects is to the
maximum achievable.
Both metrics are computed using the same information, and
one can trivially be computed from the other. The difference
is, however, that the effective anonymity set size ties the
anonymity to the actual number of users in the system; while
the degree of anonymity makes abstraction on the number of
users and focusses on the performance of the system (i.e., how
close it is to the maximum achievable anonymity).
VI. EXAMPLE: CROWDS
Crowds [8] is designed to provide anonymity to users who
want to access web pages. To achieve this goal, the designers
introduce the notion of blending into a crowd: users are
grouped into a set, and they forward requests within this set
before the request is sent to the web server. The web server
cannot know from which member the request originated, since
it gets the request from a random member of the crowd, who
is forwarding the message on behalf of the real originator. The
users (members of the crowd) are called jondos.
The system works as follows: when a jondo wants to request
a web page it sends the request to a second (randomly chosen)
jondo. This jondo will, with probability pf , forward the request
to a third jondo (again, randomly chosen), and will, with
probability (1− pf ) submit it to the server. Each jondo in the
path (except for the first one) chooses to forward or submit the
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Fig. 3. Example of a Crowds system with 7 jondos
request independently from the decisions of the predecessors
in the path.
Communication between jondos is encrypted, and the final
request to the server is sent in clear text. Every jondo can ob-
serve the contents of the message (and thus the address of the
target server), but it cannot know whether the predecessor is
the originator of the message or whether he is just forwarding
a message received by another member.
A. Attack Model
In this section we calculate the degree of anonymity pro-
vided by Crowds to its users, with respect to colluding crowd
members, that is, a set of corrupted jondos that collaborate in
order to disclose the identity of the jondo that originated the
request. The assumptions made on the attacker are:
• Internal: The attacker controls some of the entities which
are part of the system.
• Passive: The corrupted jondos can listen to communi-
cation. Although they have the ability to add or delete
messages, they do not gain extra information on the
identity of the originator by doing so.
• Partial: We assume the attacker controls a limited set C
of jondos, and cannot perform any traffic analysis on the
rest of the system.
• Static: The set of jondos controlled by the adversary is
fixed.
• Temporary: The adversary does not need to observe the
system for long time to deploy this attack. Permanent
attackers may refine the attack by correlating subsequent
connections.
B. Effective anonymity set size
Figure 3 shows an example of a crowds system. In this
example the jondos 1 and 2 are controlled by the attacker, i.e.,
they are colluding crowd members. An honest jondo creates a
path that includes at least one corrupted jondo.1 The adversary
wants to know which of the jondos is the real originator of
the message.
In a general Crowds network, let N denote the number of
members of the crowd, C the number of malicious collabora-
tors, pf the probability of forwarding and pi the probability
1If the path does not go through a corrupted jondo the attacker cannot get
any information.
Fig. 4. Effective Anonymity Set Size for Crowds (N=20)
of being originator of a request assigned by the attacker to
jondo i. From [8] we know that, under the described attack
model, the probability assigned to the predecessor of the first
malicious jondo in the path (for simplicity, let this jondo be
number C+1) equals:
pC+1 =
N − pf (N − C − 1)
N
= 1− pf N − C − 1
N
.
The probabilities assigned to the colluding jondos remain zero,
and assuming that the adversary does not have any extra




N − C − 1 =
pf
N
, C + 2 ≤ i ≤ N .
Applying the formula of the entropy presented in Sect. V-A,
the effective anonymity set size under these attack conditions
can be computed as:
H(X) =





N − pf (N − C − 1)
]
+pf








As we can see, the effective anonymity set size for Crowds
is a function of N , C and pf . In order to show the variation
of H(X) with respect to these parameters we chose pf = 0.5
and pf = 0.75. The effective anonymity set sizes for a system
with N = 20 and N = 100 are shown in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5. The
anonymity metric is a function of the number C of colluding
jondos, which takes values between 1 and N − 1. Note that if
C = 0 there is no adversary, and the effective anonymity set
size is maximum (log2(N)); if C = N the adversary controls
all jondos, leaving none to attack.
As we can see in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, the effective anonymity
set size decreases almost linearly with the number of colluding
jondos (controlled by the adversary), down to zero when
the adversary controls N − 1 jondos (and is thus able to
uniquely identify messages sent by the remaining jondo). We
can also see in the figures that the effective anonymity set size
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Fig. 5. Effective Anonymity Set Size for Crowds (N=100)
is bigger for higher values of pf . This indicates a tradeoff
between anonymity and performance, as higher pf implies
more intermediate jondos in the communication path, and
therefore more delay. Regarding the number of members of
the crowd, it is clear that the larger the crowd, the higher the
value of the effective anonymity set size.
Note that the figures presented correspond to a particular
type of attack (namely, the ”collaborating jondos attack”
as described in [8]). The variation of anonymity towards
adversaries capable of deploying other attacks may be very
different from the results presented in this example. The same
applies to the results shown in the next section for the degree
of anonymity.
C. Degree of anonymity
The degree of anonymity is obtained normalizing the effec-
tive anonymity set size with respect to the maximum entropy,
HM . Taking into account that the size of the anonymity set is
N −C (the C colluding jondos are not part of the anonymity
set), HM equals:
HM = log2 (N − C) .
According to the formulas presented in Sect. V-C, we
compute the degree of anonymity, d. Figure 6 represents the
degree of anonymity for 20 crowd members, and Fig. 7 for 100
members. As in the figures of the effective anonymity set size,
the probability of forwarding pf has been set to 0.5 and 0.75,
and the variable in the x axis is the number C of corrupted
jondos.
We can see in the figures that d decreases with the number
of collaborating jondos and increases with pf . The variation
of d is very similar for systems with different number of users.
If we compare the results of the two proposed metrics, we
can see that while the effective anonymity set size presents
large variations in C = 1 for different values of N (from
log2(5) = 2.32 to log2(100) = 6.64), the degree of anonymity
for both crowds systems (N = 20, 100) takes values between
0.8 and 0.9 for pf = 0.75, and between 0.6 and 0.7 for pf =
Fig. 6. Degree of Anonymity for Crowds (N=20)
Fig. 7. Degree of Anonymity for Crowds (N=100)
0.5 (evaluated in C = 1). Also, the effective anonymity set
size decreases almost linearly, while the degree of anonymity
is concave.
The information provided by these metrics can be combined
to give a better estimation of the anonymity offered to users.
The effective anonymity set size gives a quantitative measure
of the (un)certainty of the attacker with respect to the identity
of a subject, while the degree of anonymity indicates the
performance of the anonymity system relative to the best it
can do for the given number of users. Note that, while the
values of the effective anonymity set size significantly increase
for N = 100 with respect to N = 20, the degree of anonymity
slightly decreases for N = 100 in comparison with N = 20.
The explanation to this lies in the fact that, although the
effective anonymity set size increases due to the increase of
potential originators of a communication, the adversary is
able to get more information (i.e., reduce his uncertainty with
respect to his a priori knowledge) from the network with more
nodes.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
Several solutions for anonymity services have been pro-
posed and implemented in the past. We propose a general
model for anonymity systems and present two existing flavors
of information theoretic metrics. These metrics provide an-
swers to the research questions formulated in the introduction:
they provide a general method to measure anonymity, to
compare different systems, to evaluate the effectiveness of
attacks on anonymity, to quantify gains and loses in anonymity
which take into account the partial or statistical information
obtained by an adversary.
With these metrics we can quantify the effective anonymity
set size and the degree of anonymity provided by a system in
particular attack circumstances. We have applied the metrics to
Crowds, an existing solution for anonymous communication,
and discussed the results obtained.
The metrics proposed can be adapted to systems where
anonymity can de defined in terms of unlinkability. Anony-
mous transactions are abstracted as IOIs (Items Of Interest);
sender and recipient anonymity can be computed applying the
general formulas.
Anonymity metrics provide relevant information on the
anonymity of concrete subjects in concrete attack scenarios.
In order to know more about the robustness of an anonymity
system, we need to make multiple measurements in different
scenarios.
The model is based on the probabilities adversaries assign
to subjects; finding these probability distributions in real
situations is however not always easy.
The question that remains open is the sufficient level of
anonymity a system should provide to be privacy enabled.
The answer to this question is different for each system, as it
depends on the (legal and social) consequences of the breach
of privacy in particular scenarios.
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